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A commentary on
Continuously cumulating meta-analysis and replicability
by Braver, S. L., Thoemmes, F. J., and Rosenthal, R. (2014). Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 9, 333–342. doi:
10.1177/1745691614529796
Braver et al. (2014) article was published by Perspectives on Psychological Science as part of a
special issue on advancing psychology toward a cumulative science. The article contributes to such
advance by proposing using meta-analysis cumulatively, rather than waiting for a long number of
replications before running such meta-analysis.
Braver et al.’s article sits well alongside a recent call for reforming psychological methods, under
the umbrella of “the new statistics” (Cumming, 2012). As it happens with the latter, the method
referred to is not new, only the call to use it is. Indeed, the idea behind a continuously cumulating
meta-analysis (CCMA) was already put forward by Rosenthal as far back as 1978 and repeated since
(e.g., Rosenthal, 1984, 1991). Yet, the reminder is as relevant today as it has been in the past, more
so if we want to get psychology, and our own research within it, at the frontier of science.
I will, however, take this opportunity to comment on an issue which I find contentious: the
meaning of the replication used to prove the point. Braver et al. define the criterion for a successful
replication as achieving conventional levels of significance. They also identify the typical low power
of psychological research as a main culprit for failing to replicate studies. Indeed, they went ahead
and simulated two normal populations with a medium effect size mean difference between them,
from which they randomly drew 10,000 pairs of underpowered samples. The results they obtained
fulfilled power expectations: about 42% of the initial studies, about 41% of the replications, and
about 70% of the combined study-replication pairs turned out statistically significant—the latter
supposedly supporting the benefits of CCMA over the uncombined studies.
What the authors fail to notice, however, is that the meaning of replication differs depending on
the data testing approach used: Fisher’s approach is not the same thanNeyman–Pearson’s (Neyman,
1942, 1955; Fisher, 1955, 1973; MacDonald, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2004; Hubbard, 2004; Louçã, 2008;
Perezgonzalez, 2015a). Neyman and Pearson’s approach (1933) is based on repeated sampling from
the same population while keeping an eye on power, which is Braver et al.’s simulation setting
(Neyman and Pearson, 1933). However, under this approach a successful replication reduces to a
count of significant results in the long run, which translates to about 80% of significant replications
when power is 0.8, or to about 41% when power is 0.41. Albeit not intentionally pursued, this is
what Braver et al.’s Table 1 shows (power lines 1 and 2, and criteria 1, 2, and 4—combining studies
is not expected under Neyman–Pearson’s approach but, given the nature of the simulation, such
combination can be taken as a third set of studies that uses larger sample sizes and, thus, more
power; criteria 5–10 can be considered punctilious studies under criterion 4). That is, Braver et al.’s
power results effectively replicate the population effect size the authors chose for their simulation.
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On the other hand, the 10,000 runs of study-replication
pairs address replication under a different testing approach,
that of Fisher’s, arguably the default one in today’s research
(Spielman, 1978; Johnstone, 1986; Cortina and Dunlap, 1997;
Hubbard, 2004; Perezgonzalez, 2015b). Under Fisher’s approach
(1954), power has no inherent meaning—a larger sample size
is more sensitive to a departure from the null hypothesis
and, thus, preferable, but the power of the test is of no
relevance. There is not knowing (or guessing) the true population
effect size beforehand, either, in which case meta-analysis helps
to approximate better the unknown effect size, exactly what
Braver et al.’s Table 2 illustrates. It is under this approach
that accumulating studies works, as a way of increasing our
knowledge further—something that Fisher (1954) had already
suggested. This is also the approach under which Rosenthal
presented his techniques for meta-analysis—indeed, he did not
contemplate power in 1978 or 1984, and hismentioning it in 1991
seems to be rather marginal to the techniques themselves.
There are other ways of carrying out replications, though,
ways more attuned to the “new statistics”—which is to say, ways
already discussed by Rosenthal (1978). One of these is to attend
to the effect sizes of studies and replications, to better know
what we want to know (Cohen, 1994) instead of merely making
dichotomous decisions based on significance (Rosenthal, 1991).
Another way is to attend to the confidence intervals of studies
and replications, as Cumming (2012) suggests.
In summary, Braver et al.’s call for CCMA is a worthy
one, even if their simulation confused the meaning of
replication under different testing approaches. One thing
left to do for this call to have better chances of succeeding is
to make CCMA easier to implement. For such purpose, the
interested researcher has a suite of readily available meta-
analysis computer applications for Microsoft’s Excel, such as
ESCI (http://www.latrobe.edu.au/psy/research/cognitive-and-
developmental-psychology/esci) and MIX (http://www.meta-
analysis-made-easy.com), and standalone computer programs
such as RevMan (http://tech.cochrane.org/revman) and CMA
(http://www.meta-analysis.com)—for more resources see also
https://www.researchgate.net/post/Which_meta-analysis_softwa
re_is_easy_to_use/1.
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